

## NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

### ANACREON 13 (358 *PMG*)

σφαίρη δηῦτέ με πορφυρῇ  
βάλλων χρυσοκόμης Ἔρως  
νήνι ποικιλοσαμβάλῳ  
συμπαίζειν προκαλεῖται·  
ἢ δ', ἐστὶν γὰρ ἀπ' εὐκτίτου  
Λέσβου, τὴν μὲν ἐμὴν κόμην,  
λευκὴ γάρ, καταμέμφεται,  
πρὸς δ' ἄλλην τινὰ χᾶσκει.

Two recent discussions of Anacreon 13 appeared almost simultaneously;<sup>1</sup> much of each is given over to the refutation of previous errors, and I refer readers to them for this purpose. With regard to the positive proposals, the article of Marcovich, I believe, has it basically right, though there are some details that yet require explanation.<sup>2</sup>

The view advocated both by Marcovich and, with the qualification to be noted, by me is the well-established one that takes ἄλλην τινά in the last line to refer to another female, and thus makes an ethnic and sexual joke out of the Lesbian girl's origins and behavior. I will first attempt to support this interpretation with evidence adduced but not fully exploited by Renehan, and apparently not known to Marcovich; I will then state my view, differing from Marcovich's, about why the poet includes the information about his hair-color; this explanation will entail discussion of the linguistic structure of lines 5–8.<sup>3</sup>

I wish to thank the Editor for his advice on this note.

1. M. Marcovich "Anacreon, 358 *PMG*," *AJP* 104 (1983): 372–83, and R. Renehan, "Anacreon Fragment 13 Page," *CP* 79 (1984): 28–32.

2. Renehan first argues from the μέν . . . δέ structure of the last four lines that κόμην (referring to a younger man's head of hair) must be supplied with πρὸς δ' ἄλλην τινά; then, on the last page, he surprisingly says that ἐστὶν γὰρ ἀπ' εὐκτίτου/Λέσβου can have led the audience to understand ἄλλην τινά as referring to another girl; and he finally proposes that the ambiguity cannot be resolved and that the poet may have intended it that way. I find the suggested ambiguity unappealing (since the interpretation that supplies κόμην with πρὸς δ' ἄλλην τινά leaves ἐστὶν γὰρ ἀπ' εὐκτίτου Λέσβου without a function; see below), and the argument that produces it self-contradictory.

3. Renehan, Marcovich, and I are all concerned chiefly with the poem's last four lines, with regard to which the first four lines become problematic only when the ball is taken to be a real one thrown by the girl (see J. A. Davison, *From Archilochus to Pindar* [London, 1968], pp. 249–50, for an extreme version, with reference to predecessors; more recently, J. F. Davidson, "Anacreon, Homer and the Young Woman from Lesbos," *Mnemosyne* 40 [1987]: 132–37); but all such literal interpretations run afoul of δηῦτε, since the general likelihood of such a thing happening twice is about nil, and the gain for the poem equal. The alternative is metaphor.

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## I

In the course of his note Renehan points out that the sentence in lines 5–8 has a parallel in Aristophanes *Ecclesiazusae* 37–39:<sup>4</sup>

ὁ γὰρ ἀνὴρ, ὦ φιλτάτη,  
Σαλαμίνιος γάρ ἐστιν ὃ ξύνειμ' ἐγώ,  
τὴν νύχθ' ὅλην ἤλαυνέ μ' ἐν τοῖς στρώμασιν.

The context in which these lines are spoken is as follows: Praxagora is waiting before dawn for her co-conspirators to assemble, and in her impatience has tried to summon one or the other by light scratching on their doors; Woman A appears and is almost immediately followed by Woman B, the speaker of 37–39, who says: “When I heard your fingers scratching, I was putting my shoes on, *not* sleeping: for (γάρ) my husband—for (γάρ) he’s (an oarsman) from Salamis, my husband is—was stroking me all night long.”

The structure can be analyzed as follows:

- I. You would expect that I was asleep;
- II. but I was not:
  - A. for my husband
    - 1. for he is from Salamis
  - A<sub>1</sub>. *would* put his oar in all night long.

The joke falls into the general category of *παρὰ προσδοκίαν*: we hear an innocent sounding series of facts that do not combine to make much sense until the punchline arrives and ties everything together in an unpredictable (and obscene) way. The function (if not the exact meaning) of the interposed γάρ-clause of “I” (“for he is from Salamis”) is perfectly clear: it provides the ethnic information that sets up and makes possible the obscene punchline.<sup>5</sup> That is its explanatory (γάρ) function; it has another function also: the information conveyed precedes that which it explains and interrupts the flow of the sentence. This disruptive positioning creates a certain tension and confusion in the audience, and this tension will have been desirable from the joke-maker’s point of view: the γάρ-clause gets the crucial information across, and so sets up the joke, but its disruptive position impedes the audience from putting everything together in anticipation of the punchline. Contrast the flatness of “My husband was stroking me all night; for he is from Salamis.”

The structure of Anacreon 13 is more complicated, but very similar nonetheless: Anacreon uses an interposed γάρ-clause twice to Aristophanes’ once. The internal workings of the second instance (λευκή γάρ) are not mysterious: τὴν μὲν . . . καταμέμφεται gives the rejection of the speaker, and the interposed γάρ-clause gives its motivation: he has gray hair.

4. “Anacreon Fragment 13 Page,” p. 31. Renehan does not draw any inferences from the passage but simply quotes it as “an exactly parallel sentence.”

5. There is no independent evidence about the sexual content of the information “from Salamis”; see R. G. Ussher, *Aristophanes: “Ecclesiazusae”* (Oxford, 1973), p. 78, for the possibilities and for other passages where “reference to Salamis seems . . . to suggest obscene allusions.” The structure of the joke is so transparent and so powerful that it removes all doubt about the kind of meaning to be supplied.

The meaning and function of the first γάρ-clause are matters of controversy; uncontroversial is its structural similarity to the second, and to the corresponding clause in Aristophanes: all three, by virtue of their interposition, anticipate what they explain and thereby disrupt the flow of their sentences. The first γάρ-clause in Anacreon resembles that in Aristophanes in an even more significant way: both interrupt their sentences in order to tell the ethnic origin of the subject; in Aristophanes this ethnic information serves to set up the obscene punchline that follows, and that is its only purpose.

There is an obvious point to be made from all this: an interposed or anticipatory γάρ-clause demands a “pay-off,” comic or otherwise; when the interposed clause contains ethnic information, the pay-off must present action associated with the ethnic group.<sup>6</sup> Thus, the parallel in Aristophanes corroborates what has been the intuition of many readers of Anacreon 13 before: the last line is set up by the preceding structure to be paid off at the end, and paid off in a manner that exploits the ethnic information given.

Now, given this newly strengthened intuition, suppose that with Renehan and others we think it possible to supply κόμην with πρὸς δ’ ἄλλην τινά: what kind of pay-off, then, will be the clause “but she gapes at another (dark or blond or at any rate non-gray) head of hair”? How does the information that “she is from well-built Lesbos” set up such a climax? The answer must be, it does not; and that failure to account for the structure, especially as illuminated by the parallel from Aristophanes, constitutes a serious defect in any interpretation that supplies κόμην in line 8.<sup>7</sup>

As for the difficulties confronting the interpretation that takes ἄλλην τινά to refer to another girl, Marcovich states the case well: those who believe that κόμην is to be understood in line 8 “have rightly objected that there is just no evidence for the assumption that ‘coming from Lesbos’ would imply ‘being a [L]esbian.’ I feel, however, that such an assumption is [certainly] possible in the time of Anacreon in view of the unmistakable homosexual inclinations of Sappho from

6. There is a comparable but nonjocular instance of an interposed γάρ-clause furnishing ethnic information in Hdt. 5. 111. 1: πυθόμενος ὦν ταῦτα [viz., that the enemy Artubios had trained his horse to rear up and knock down infantrymen with his feet] ὁ Ὀνήσιλος, ἦν γάρ οἱ ὑπασπιστὴς γένος μὲν Κάρ, τὰ δὲ πολέμια κάρτα δόκιμος καὶ ἄλλως λήματος πλέος, εἶπε πρὸς τοῦτον κτλ. After arrangements are made and the plan is put into action, there comes the “pay off” of the ethnic information at the climax (5. 112. 2): ἐνθαῦτα ὁ Κάρ δρεπάνῳ πλήξας ἀπαράσσει τοῦ ἵππου τοὺς πόδας. The ethnic information is here repeated, for the first time after the Carian’s introduction, in order to elucidate the relevant point, the “pay-off”: he used the δρέπανον, “a weapon peculiar to Carians and Lycians” (W. W. How and J. Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus*, vol. 2 [Oxford, 1912], p. 62, referring to 7. 92–93), and one uniquely suitable for “mowing down” the legs of an offensive horse.

7. See Marcovich, “Anacreon, 358 *PMG*,” p. 374, for a similar argument. Renehan entertains the possibility that if “Lesbian women were renowned for their beauty, the statement here [that the girl is from Lesbos] could simply mean that the girl can afford to pick and choose; she is beautiful” (“Anacreon Fragment 13 Page,” p. 30; cf. M. L. West, “Melica,” *CQ* 20 [1970]: 209: “Lesbian girls can afford to be choosy,” and Davidson, “Anacreon, Homer and the Young Woman from Lesbos,” p. 133). The evidence for the Lesbian reputation for feminine beauty rests on *Il.* 9. 129–30 Λεσβίδας, ἥς ὅτε Λέσβον εὐκτιμένην ἔλεν αὐτὸς/ἔξελόμην, αἱ κάλλει ἐνίκων φύλα γυναικῶν—where the imperfect ἐνίκων shows that the antecedent of the relative in αἱ κάλλει ἐνίκων is not Lesbian women in general, but a particular group—and on the attestations in Alcaeus frag. 130. 32–33, et al. (see Renehan, “Anacreon Fragment 13 Page,” p. 30) that beauty contests were held on the island. Do beauty contests necessarily imply singular beauty?

Lesbos, as expressed in her poetry.”<sup>8</sup> This argument seems to me to incline the balance of probabilities to the favor of understanding κόρη in the last line.

## II

There remains the question about the speaker’s hair-color. Marcovich agrees with Gomme and others that his view raises the following problem: “If the girl’s choice is not between an old and a young man, but between a man and a woman, then what is the relevance of the information that the poet’s hair is white (λευκή γάρ)?” Marcovich’s answer is that “the girl’s scorn of the poet’s white hair was expressed in words—the verb καταμέμφεται seems to imply this, as does the Homeric ἐπιμέμφεσθαι—and that λευκή γάρ is actually the reason adduced by the girl. She is pretending, ‘You are too old for me,’ while concealing the real reason for rejecting the poet: ‘You are a man.’”<sup>9</sup> This explanation seems to me to be too complicated: it depends upon an opposition of stated (and false) pretext versus hidden (and true) motive that has been difficult to establish even where more explicit language is used (as in Thuc. 1. 23);<sup>10</sup> and it is in any case far more than can be legitimately extracted from the possible connotations of the single word καταμέμφεται.

I prefer to approach the problem from a different angle: why should we assume that the girl is the one who makes the speaker’s hair or age an excuse? It has been taken as axiomatic that the reason given—old age—is the girl’s reason; and the punchline seems to strengthen this assumption: she has something to hide. But it is evident from the last line that the girl is not hiding anything; her interest in the other girl is, on the speaker’s account, there for all to see. If her intent is to deceive, this unconcealed pursuit is inexplicable.

On the other hand, the conclusion that there is deceit in the poem is irresistible: the incompatibility of the two explanations compels it. But if there is intentional deceit, cui bono? Clearly the poet, who directs his listeners to a false but plausible explanation of the girl’s indifference, and thereby sets them up for the surprise and humor of the insulting “true” explanation that immediately supersedes the first. If in arranging all this the poet should leave the impression (e.g., with Marcovich) that the false explanation has been tendered by the girl—that she, in other words, besides being a “pervert,” is also a liar—well, so much the better. The apparent

8. “Anacreon, 358 *PGM*,” p. 374. Renehan rejects this argument as circular, since Anacreon 13 “is the only extant evidence” that in Anacreon’s time “Lesbos . . . already suggested female homosexuality” (“Anacreon Fragment 13 Page,” p. 30). The Aristophanes parallel adduced by Renehan leads us a little out of the circle; though late, it does prove that the formal structure common to it and Anacreon 13 was suitable for the kind of joke that the “lesbian” interpretation creates; in short, it puts the burden of proof on those whose interpretations fail to provide the interposed γάρ-clause with an appropriate pay off. As regards the chronology of the equation of “from Lesbos” with “lesbian,” note that Anacreon’s joke requires that the equation only be possible (as pointed out by Renehan, *ibid.*), but it does not work at all if the equation is so well established as to be automatic. With regard to the lack of external evidence for the equation, Chamaeleon’s claim (Ath. 13. 599C = frag. 26 Wehrli) that the poem was directed at Sappho may indicate that he, at least, was able to see it.

9. “Anacreon, 358 *PMG*,” p. 375; cf. Campbell’s note (*Greek Lyric Poetry* [London, 1967], p. 321) on line 8 of the poem.

10. See G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (London, 1972), pp. 52–58.

inconsistency is to be explained solely through the illogic upon which jokes made *παρὰ προσδοκίαν* depend (cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 3. 1412a19–32 on humorous deception of expectations, and 1412a34–b3 on the phenomenon in ethnic jokes).<sup>11</sup>

This joke logic that I perceive is created with and depends on the logical appearances of the Greek language. Renehan argued at length that the *μέν . . . δέ* antithesis in lines 5–8 made it “all but unavoidable to supply mentally” *κόμην* in line 8.<sup>12</sup> Marcovich argued that the same antithetic structure opposed the spoken pretext with the covert motive. The truth is that the apparent logic is confuted by the joke logic. Renehan and others who place heavy emphasis on the *μέν . . . δέ* structure are right, insofar as it is Anacreon’s purpose to create expectations that his punchline defies *παρὰ προσδοκίαν*. The *μέν . . . δέ* structure provides the “apparent logic.” The contrapuntal “joke logic” inheres in the structuring of the *γάρ*-clauses that so closely resembles the identically motivated passage from Aristophanes described earlier:

1. ἡ δ’,  
  - 1<sub>a</sub>. ἐστὶν γὰρ ἀπ’ εὐκτίτου Λέσβου,
  2. τὴν μὲν ἐμὴν κόμην,
  - 2<sub>a</sub>. λευκὴ γάρ,
  2. καταμέμφεται,
1. πρὸς δ’ ἄλλην τινὰ χάσκει.

“2” is enclosed by “1,” which, by virtue of occupying the most emphatic first and last positions, has greater logical and rhetorical importance. As far as “1” and “1<sub>a</sub>” are concerned, their hierarchical superiority simply reflects the basic rule that “everything between the last stop and the word preceding *μέν* applies to the whole *μέν . . . δέ* complex,”<sup>13</sup> which in this case is the remainder of the sentence in its entirety. It is in this asymmetrical structure that the “joke logic” inheres: the first *γάρ*-clause has been given its privileged early position for the purpose of setting up the punchline at the end.

Now, as I say, this enclosing structure carries the “joke logic” and stands in tension with the *μέν . . . δέ* structure, which carries the “apparent logic.” The two structures thus oppose one another, but not in so blatant a manner that the conflict threatens the smooth arrival at the punchline; the tension is managed so as not to violate the norms of Greek. The relevant norms have been misunderstood; I will first explain in greater detail how the two competing systems harmonize, then say more on how they conflict.

The enclosing “joke” structure is tied to the antithetical *μέν . . . δέ* structure by a shared element, *ἡ δ’*, which is the single subject of the coordinate verb clauses *τὴν μὲν ἐμὴν κόμην καταμέμφεται* and *πρὸς δ’ ἄλλην τινὰ χάσκει*. The latter clause proves most important once the punchline has been reached, but the linear progress to this goal determines the use of the *μέν . . . δέ* structure to begin with: the main action of the poem—“A girl from Lesbos chooses her partner for the evening”—is developed in two successive acts, the rejection of the speaker, and the preferring of an unidentified woman. These two acts are presented as being

11. I owe this reference to an anonymous referee for *CP*.

12. “Anacreon Fragment 13 Page,” p. 31.

13. J. D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles*<sup>2</sup> (Oxford, 1954), p. 371.

temporally successive,<sup>14</sup> and form a natural and complementary contrast (rejection of a pursuer and pursuit of another). Of these characteristics, the first is expressed by the usual technique of making the narrative presentation reproduce the sequential ordering of the events depicted (the first action comes first, the second second, etc.), an ordering that happily coincides in this case with the need to have the second action, which constitutes the punchline, come last; the μέν . . . δέ structure coordinates the two successive and independent verb clauses. The second characteristic—the contrast between the two acts—answers at the level of the “apparent logic” the question why, given that there are many possible ways of coordinating parallel clauses, did Anacreon use μέν and δέ here? The answer is that they are the particles most suited for the coordination of naturally contrasting and complementary pairs.

So much for the harmonization of the competing logics; what about the disruption? As I say, Anacreon uses the “apparent logic” to mislead his audience, whose representatives I will now take Renehan and Marcovich to be. The two scholars first assume that the μέν . . . δέ combination must coordinate specific verbal antitheses, and then proceed to generate opposites out of the rigorously antithetical structure thus assumed: if X (“my hair” or “the stated pretext”) goes with μέν, then δέ must introduce “the opposite of X” (“someone else’s hair” or “the covert motive”). This assumption is both natural and, as I have said, accurate as an account of the deceptive expectations created by the poem’s “apparent logic.” As we have seen, however, this procedure, the generation of opposites out of μέν . . . δέ, produces results that are unacceptable on other grounds. The “apparent logic” of μέν . . . δέ is and must be superseded by the “joke logic” in order to avoid these errors.

It may be complained that I am trying to have things both ways: the expectations created by the μέν are valid insofar as the poet exploits them to mislead the audience into generating a predictable δέ-clause complement; on the other hand, these expectations are defied by the enclosing structure, which is both the vehicle for the real “joke logic” and the true generator of the δέ-clause punchline. The charge is cogent, but perhaps not so cogent that we should imagine a member of Anacreon’s audience standing up and objecting: “Your joke is invalid: you misled us with an incorrect use of μέν . . . δέ.” The answer will be that even if μέν and δέ often, or even usually, perform in the rigidly antithetical way assumed by Renehan and Marcovich, this does not mean that they always do. The particles can be used to contrast ideas that are not embodied in single words or phrases, and can do so even when the logical contrast is promoted at the cost of an expected verbal contrast.<sup>15</sup> An example of this type is furnished by a poem of Anacreon’s contemporary, Ibycus (*PMG* 286. 1–7):

ἦρι μὲν αἶ τε Κυδώνιαι  
μηλίδες ἀρδόμεναι ῥοᾶν  
ἐκ ποταμῶν, ἵνα Παρθένων  
κῆπος ἀκήρατος, αἶ τ' οἶνανθίδες

14. Whether the situation “in fact” developed in this sequence is irrelevant; the sequence as presented serves the joke-teller’s purposes.

15. Cf. Denniston, *Greek Particles*<sup>2</sup>, p. 372.

αὐξόμεναι σκιεροῖσιν ὕφ' ἔρνεσιν  
οἶναρέοις θαλέθοισιν, ἔμοι δ' ἔρος  
οὐδεμίαν κατάκοιτος ὥραν.

From ἦρι μὲν κτλ. we would not have expected what we in fact get: ἔμοι δέ, with οὐδεμίαν ὥραν casually tucked in later. Likewise, in Anacreon 13, we should not insist that because the μέν has κόμην, the δέ must, too. The contrast that is ultimately revealed may not fulfill our precise expectations—the joke is made παρὰ προσδοκίαν, after all—but the revelation does not utterly violate acceptable usage, either: the contrast simply rests with the fact that the μέν-clause gives the rejection of one person, the δέ-clause the pursuit of another; it cannot be pressed further. For an instance where the antithetical force of μέν . . . δέ is superseded by an enclosing structure (resembling that of Anacreon 13. 5–8 as analyzed above), compare Tyrtaeus 10. 27–29 West:

νέοισι δὲ πάντ' ἐπέοικεν,  
ὄφρ' ἐρατῆς ἥβης ἀγλαὸν ἄνθος ἔχη,  
ἀνδράσι μὲν θηητὸς ἰδεῖν ἐρατὸς δὲ γυναιξί.<sup>16</sup>

Here the antithesis lies between ἀνδράσι and γυναιξί, while μέν . . . δέ look as if they are trying to oppose the incommensurable pair, ἀνδράσι and ἐρατὸς;<sup>17</sup> contrast, for example, Mimnermus 1. 9 ἀλλ' ἐχθρὸς μὲν παισίν, ἀτίμαστος δὲ γυναιξίν.

HAYDEN PELLICCIA  
Cornell University

16. Reading (with Bergk, West, and Gentili-Prato) Reiske's θηητὸς for the MSS' θνητοῖσιν in line 29. Whatever it was, there can be no doubt but that some masc. nom. sing. adjective stood here. The line thus emended has a precise, pyramidal symmetry (ἰδεῖν at the exact center, with 7 syllables on each side), and it may be complained that the emendation is suspicious for that reason alone; but as Calvert Watkins points out to me, the preceding (ὄφρ' ἐρατῆς ἥβης ἀγλαὸν ἄνθος ἔχη) and succeeding (ζῶδς ἐών, καλὸς δ' ἐν προμάχοισι πεσών) pentameters are also symmetrical, which suggests that symmetry was being deliberately sought throughout. See next note.

17. Cf. the pentameter quoted in Aristotle *EN* 2.5 1106b28 (= *Adespota Elegiaca* 3 West = *Frag. Adesp.* 11 Bergk<sup>4</sup>) ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί, where some of the MSS (see Bergk) read κακοὶ δὲ παντοδαπῶς (this passage was drawn to my attention by A. B. Westervelt).

## OVID AND DIVUS AUGUSTUS

The evidence of the poets is of particular interest to the social historian in that poetry seems often to provide the clearest reflection of popular attitudes and practices.<sup>1</sup> Ovid, for example, makes frequent allusions to the emperor's divinity in terms that add up to a clear case of special pleading, the hope that by extravagant metaphor he can touch the emperor's heart and secure his own return from exile.<sup>2</sup> But are all passages of this sort to be dismissed as "verbal intoxication," verbiage pure and simple? In a poem written at a time when the emperor was already dead the poet says that Augustus, now one with the gods, can hear his

1. F. Bömer, "Vergil und Augustus," *Gymnasium* 58 (1951): 33.

2. See in general K. Scott, "Emperor Worship in Ovid," *TAPA* 61 (1930): 43–69, esp. 44–45, 68–69.